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I. INTRODUCTION
HE aggressive antitrust enforcement activities by the UnitedTStates Department of Justice Antitrust Division against interna-
tional cartels in the last decade, coupled with the increasingly
global character of commercial markets, have spawned significant private
antitrust treble damages litigation in American courts by foreign plain-
tiffs. Not surprisingly, the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act has
been a threshold issue in these cases. While jurisdictional questions are
not new to American courts, this latest round of antitrust cases has posed
novel issues of subject matter jurisdiction,1 including the extent to which
foreign plaintiffs claiming antitrust damages based on foreign transac-
tions may sue in American courts under the Sherman Act.
Historically, the federal courts have disagreed over the extraterritorial
reach of the antitrust laws. 2 The courts have developed various tests to
determine the precise scope of the Sherman Act, but these efforts have
generated a body of case law that is both "confusing and unsettled."' 3 In
1982, Congress sought to clarify matters by enacting the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 (FTAIA). 4 Designed explicitly to
limit Sherman Act jurisdiction, the FTAIA exempted certain foreign con-
duct from antitrust scrutiny but also made clear that when foreign trans-
actions were involved, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show that this
1. The majority of courts treat jurisdictional questions under the FTAIA as going to
the issue of the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus
Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003). Some judges, however, have questioned whether
the issue is really a matter of legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction rather than subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 953 (Wood, J., dissenting). Subject matter jurisdiction goes to
the power to decide a case; legislative jurisdiction is the power to prescribe a rule of law.
Id. Put another way, does the FTAIA purport to strip federal courts of jurisdiction in
certain cases where its test is not met or does it instead describe an element of the plain-
tiff's claim?
The question is not merely of academic interest and may indeed have a significant practi-
cal effect on the progress of a case. If it is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, the
matter can be dismissed on the pleadings. On the other hand, if the issue is a matter of
legislative jurisdiction, the case will normally not be successfully dismissed on a threshold
motion and must await summary judgment upon a full pretrial record.
2. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 423-24 (5th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
3. Id. at 424.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
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conduct had a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
domestic commerce.5 Unfortunately, the FTAIA, rather than clarifying
the reach of the antitrust laws, has only heightened the confusion.
This article will (1) analyze the historic bases for exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign transactions under the antitrust laws; (2)
review the scope of the FTAIA and the varied judicial opinions purport-
ing to construe it; and (3) propose an interpretative framework that is
consistent with both legislative intent and long-recognized common-law
limits on the power of American courts.
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORIC TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN-BASED CLAIMS
A. THE COURTS: ALCOA AND ITS PROGENY
Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract, combina-
tion .. .or, conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce, among the
several states, or with foreign nations."'6 Notwithstanding the broad lan-
guage of the Sherman Act and its specific reference to foreign commerce,
the courts have long presumed that "legislation of Congress, unless a con-
trary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial limits of
the United States."'7 Historically, courts of the United States have been
circumspect in applying American antitrust laws to conduct occurring
outside of the country. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,8 the
Court, per Justice Holmes, held that the Sherman Act could have no ap-
plication to conduct occurring outside the United States and that a statute
must be "confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power." As American
traders became increasingly involved in the international arena, the Su-
preme Court relaxed the hard-line position expressed in American Ba-
nana and held that federal courts could assert antitrust jurisdiction over
foreign defendants if domestic commerce were affected and some con-
duct occurred in the United States.9
The Second Circuit sought further to refine the jurisdictional analysis
in the Alcoa case.' 0 Writing for the court, Judge Learned Hand articu-
lated what has become known as the "effects test" and held that the Sher-
man Act does proscribe extraterritorial acts which are "intended to affect
imports [into the United States] and did affect them." In so holding, the
court limited American Banana to cases where extraterritorial acts pro-
duced no anticompetitive effects in the United States." At the same
time, Alcoa made clear that "[w]e should not impute to Congress an in-
5. Id.
6. Id. § 1.
7. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citation omitted).
8. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
9. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927).
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. Id. at 444.
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tent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no
consequences within the United States."'1 2 The Second Circuit did not
attempt to articulate the point at which foreign acts were qualitatively
and quantitatively sufficient to affect domestic commerce and thus confer
jurisdiction on American courts.
The effects test has been widely, but by no means universally, followed
by other courts.13 Concerned that the Alcoa test did not adequately ac-
count for the interests of foreign states, the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Corp.14 added a gloss to Alcoa by creat-
ing a jurisdictional rule of reason. This rule required a comity-based bal-
ancing test as well as an analysis of domestic effects when assessing the
reach of the antitrust laws over foreign defendants. The Fifth Circuit
adopted a similar approach in American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice
Growers Cooperative Ass'n. 15 While one cannot fault these courts for at-
tempting to develop comprehensive jurisdictional standards, it is undenia-
ble that infusing the issue of comity into the jurisdictional analysis has
generated more confusion than certainty and has created significant un-
predictability in the law.
Without specifically addressing the differing standards which had per-
colated up through the circuit courts, the Supreme Court, in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California,'6 clearly embraced the effects test. Without
so much as a nod to comity, the Court there ruled that a civil antitrust
action could go forward, despite the fact that the alleged violations oc-
curred entirely on British soil, where it could be shown that the foreign
conduct "was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial
effect in the United States.' 7
The rationale from Alcoa and Hartford Fire was subsequently adopted
in the criminal context in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.' 8
In Nippon Paper, the First Circuit held that a Japanese manufacturer of
thermal fax paper could be held criminally liable for violating American
12. Id.
13. In the years since the Alcoa decision, the courts and commentators have disagreed
as to whether an assertion of antitrust jurisdiction over foreign activities requires both an
actual effect on United States commerce and an intent to affect domestic commerce, or
whether effect alone or an intent to affect the commerce of the United States by itself is
sufficient. See Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003); see also Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (foreign conduct must have an actual effect on American
commerce); 1 WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
§ 2.12, at 82 (4th ed. 1991) (suggesting both a direct and substantial effects test and an
element of intent where "U.S. jurisdiction is based upon acts or agreements abroad which
are not in the flow of foreign commerce"); 1A PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW $ 272a, at 350, J 272f, at 354 (2d ed. 2000) (proposing a "significant ef-
fects" test).
14. 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. 701 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1983).
16. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
17. Id. at 796; accord Filetech, S.A. v. Fr. Telecom, S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 931 (2d Cir.
1998); United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D. Mass. 1999).
18. 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
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antitrust laws by agreeing with rivals to impose resale price maintenance
on unaffiliated trading houses that resold the paper in the United States.
Liability could be imposed even if it had no operations within the United
States and all alleged price-fixing activities occurred completely outside
the United States.19 All of the co-conspirators were Japanese companies;
all meetings at which price-fixing was discussed took place in Japan; all
sales to distributors subject to the price-fixing agreement took place in
Japan; and all monitoring took place in Japan.20
On these facts, the trial court dismissed the indictment for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.21 The First Circuit reversed the trial court and
held that jurisdiction existed using a two-step analysis. First, relying on
Hartford Fire, the court found that "the case law now conclusively estab-
lishes that civil antitrust actions predicated on wholly foreign conduct
which has an intended and substantial effect in the United States come
within Section One's jurisdictional reach."'22 Second, the court concluded
that since the same language in § 1 of the Sherman Act creates both crim-
inal and civil liability, the Hartford Fire rationale applies equally in crimi-
nal cases. The court noted that "it would be disingenuous ... to pretend
that the words [of Section 1] had lost their clarity merely because this is a
criminal proceeding. '2 3 Accordingly, it is fair to say that the Alcoa ef-
fects test, notwithstanding its imprecision, is now widely accepted by
courts.
24
The Alcoa line of cases deals essentially with foreign conduct having
anticompetitive effects in the domestic arena. A second line of cases
deals with the mirror image of Alcoa-foreign purchasers who are victim-
ized by anticompetitive conduct in the United States market. In Pfizer
Inc. v. India,25 the Supreme Court held that foreign purchasers victimized
by antitrust violations committed by domestic sellers have a remedy
under the United States antitrust laws. The Court reached this conclu-
sion in two stages. First, it found that foreign governments, like foreign
corporations, were "persons" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act 26 and that Congress did not intend to deny foreigners a remedy
when they are injured by antitrust violations that would give American
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 944 F. Supp. 55, 64 (D. Mass. 1996).
22. Nippon Paper, 109 F.3d at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) ("It is
well-established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.") (citing
Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986)); Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian Work Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It has
long been settled law that a country can regulate conduct occurring outside its territory
which causes harmful results within its territory."); see also 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 13, 270b, at 336 ("The central point, now well established, is that conduct,
whether at home or abroad, can be reached by our antitrust laws when it affects competi-
tion within the United States or export competition from the United States.").
25. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
26. Id. at 313-14.
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victims a right to sue. 27
Second, the Court found that allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue would
not only enhance the antitrust goals of compensation, deterrence, and
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, but also would enhance protection of
domestic consumers.28 The Court noted that where a case involved a
conspiracy that operated both domestically and internationally, excluding
foreign plaintiffs would undermine deterrence by encouraging wrongdo-
ers to undertake worldwide conspiracies because wrongdoers would
know that any losses in the United States through treble damages law-
suits might be more than offset by ill-gotten gains reaped in the foreign
phase.29 On the other hand, forcing conspirators to take into account the
full cost of their conduct by permitting foreign buyers to sue would tend
to optimize the deterrent effect of the treble damages remedy. 30
Pfizer did not involve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and in-
deed predates the FTAIA by four years.31 Given that the plaintiffs in
Pfizer had entered the domestic market and made purchases in the
United States, jurisdiction under the Sherman Act was clear.32 Indeed,
the Court never discussed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Never-
theless, subsequent courts have seized on the deterrence rationale in Pfi-
zer-albeit wrongly-to justify the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction
over antitrust claims by certain foreign purchasers. 33
B. CONGRESS: THE FTAIA
1. The Statute
The FTAIA 34 was passed as part of the Export Trading Company Act
of 1982. Enacted as an exception to the Sherman Act, the statute pro-
vides that:
Sections 1 to 7 of [title 15] shall not apply to conduct involving trade
or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with
foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce
with foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or export com-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 315.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 304 n.10 (3d Cir.
2002); Sniado v. Bank Aus., N.A., 174 F. Supp. 2d 159, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
32. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 315; Sniado, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also
Den Norske Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 435 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. de-
nied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("[I]n Pfizer, the sales were made
in the United States.").
33. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
reh'g denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19042 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2003).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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merce with foreign nations of a person engaged in such
trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1
to 7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of
the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title
shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the
United States.35
The FTAIA is very difficult to read. Its draftsmanship has been chari-
tably described as "cumbersome and inelegant. ' 36 The FTAIA is perhaps
described as a drafting disaster, the worst nightmare of every legislation
professor. Its obtuse language has provided a field day for critics. 37
By its terms, the statute limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the
antitrust laws by providing that the Sherman Act shall not apply to trade
or commerce with foreign nations unless (1) the conduct has a "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic or export
commerce of the United States and (2) "such effect gives rise to a claim"
under the Sherman Act.38 The FTAIA also provides an exception to the
exception by specifically asserting jurisdiction over matters involving im-
port trade or commerce.39 Put another way, the Sherman Act applies to
conduct involving commerce with foreign nations if and only if:
(1) that conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect -
(A) on domestic commerce or on import commerce or
(B) on export commerce with foreign nations of a person en-
gaged in export commerce in USA; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under sections 1 to 7 of the Sher-
man Act.
Not only is the FTAIA difficult to read, it is difficult to comprehend.
The text of the statute does not speak to the question of what kind of
extraterritorial conduct is within the ambit of the antitrust laws. On its
face, the FI'AIA is neutral as between citizens of the United States and
foreign citizens.40 Similarly, the statute is neutral as to conduct occurring
within or outside of the United States. 41 The focus of the statute is
whether there is an anticompetitive effect in the United States.
35. Id.
36. 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, 272; United Phosphorus Ltd. v.
Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 2001), affd, 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.
2003); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 714 (D. Md. 2001).
37. See, e.g., SPENCER WALLER, ANTITRUST LAWS & INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE,
§ 6.03 (1992) ("If Congress intended to clarify the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act
over export activity and promote greater certainty it failed [in enacting the FTAIA].");
Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that the
language of the FTAIA is "convoluted").
38. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
39. Id.
40. Salil Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 40




The FTAIA carves out certain conduct-other than import com-
merce-involving trade or commerce with foreign nations.42 It then
"carves back in" that very conduct if (1) the conduct has a "direct, sub-
stantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on the domestic commerce of
the United States and (2) that domestic effect "gives rise to a claim"
under the Sherman Act.43 Again, the FTAIA itself does not illuminate
the meaning of either of the foregoing conditions; and, as discussed in
detail below, courts have disagreed as to the proper interpretation of
both.
2. The Legislative History
The legislative history of the FTAIA sheds some, but not much, light
on this opaque statute.44 The history reveals two distinct and potentially
conflicting purposes. First, the FTAIA was intended to limit the antitrust
exposure of American exporters. 45 The legislation was in part a response
to "a perception [which] exists among businessmen, especially small busi-
nessmen, that antitrust law prohibits efficiency-enhancing joint export ac-
tivities."'4 6 Specifically, American sellers engaged in export commerce
were concerned that the antitrust laws put them at a competitive disad-
vantage in the international arena. The FTAIA was designed "to en-
courage the business community to engage in efficiency producing joint
conduct in the export of American goods and services. '47 The statute
also "was intended to exempt from the Sherman Act export transactions
that did not injure the United States economy. ' 48 The fact that the
FTAIA was enacted as a part of the Export Trading Company Act of
1982 leaves no doubt that Congress sought to limit the potential antitrust
exposure of domestic exporters.
Second, Congress intended to clarify the jurisdictional reach of the
Sherman Act to international transactions.4 9 While most courts con-
curred in Alcoa's central proposition that subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking where the requisite domestic effects cannot be shown, the precise
parameters of the effects test remained uncharted. Accordingly, the leg-
islature sought to enact a "single, objective test-the 'direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable effect' test" that would "serve as a simple and
straightforward clarification of existing American law." in cases involving
42. Id. at 290.
43. Id.
44. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796-97 n.23 (1993).
49. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002); Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int'l Corp., 153 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Pa. 2001); United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F.
Supp. 2d 1003, 1024 (N.D. I11. 2001) ("Congress enacted the FTAIA as an amendment to
the Sherman Act to clarify the extra-territorial reach of the federal antitrust laws."), affd,
322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003).
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trade or commerce with foreign nations.50
Yet, there is nothing about the FTAIA itself that is "simple and
straightforward." Nor is there any consensus as to how the FTAIA itself
clarifies the law. Noting that the legislative history cites Judge Hand's
Alcoa opinion with approval, some courts urge that the FTAIA merely
codifies the Alcoa effects test.51 At least one court has suggested that the
FTAIA expands subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. 52
Still other courts maintain that any such expansive reading of the FTAIA
would be unreasonable.5 3
In short, the legislative history is not definitive on the interplay be-
tween the statute and prior case law. In particular, the legislative history
provides little guidance on two key aspects of the statute: (1) what consti-
tutes "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic
commerce; and (2) what is meant by the anticompetitive effect that "gives
rise to a claim" under the Sherman Act. It has therefore fallen to the
courts to determine the precise meaning and scope of the FTAIA.
III. CONCRETE FACTUAL SCENARIOS IN WHICH
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES ARISE
After a prolonged period of dormancy, the FTAIA has taken center
stage in the antitrust sphere in light of the increasingly globalized econ-
omy and the aggressive prosecution of foreign-based cartels by the Anti-
trust Division. 54 These phenomena have combined to produce a new
50. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 2.
51. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La Roche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
reh'g denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19042 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2003); Kruman v. Christie's
Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002).
52. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 714-15 (D. Md. 2001).
53. In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887 (W.D. Wis. 2000), rev'd sub
nom., Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2003).
54. E.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Combat-
ting international cartels continues to be an enforcement priority at the Department of
Justice. As the head of the Antitrust Division recently observed:
An effective anti-cartel enforcement program should be the top enforcement
priority for every antitrust agency, and it will continue to be so for us. Inter-
national cartels have become more common in recent decades as the econ-
omy has become more globalized. Cartels often involve massive volumes of
commerce, which in turn means they inflict great harm on American busi-
nesses and consumers. We have continued our decade-long concentration of
criminal resources on our international cartel program. This focus had led to
increased detection and prosecution of major international cartels. At the
same time, many other governments have strengthened their own anti-cartel
enforcement programs and cooperated with the Division in prosecuting in-
ternational cartels. Building on these successes is a key priority for the
Division.
Since late 1996, the Division has prosecuted international cartels affecting
over $10 billion in U.S. commerce. Well over 90 percent of the total criminal
fines we have obtained in this time period were from international cartel
cases. Many of you have spent much of your professional careers in an anti-
trust world where $1 million fines were extraordinary: we now have obtained
38 fines of $10 million or more and six fines of $100 million or more. The
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class of private antitrust plaintiff in United States courts-foreign pur-
chasers claiming damages based on transactions consummated outside
the United States. The issue of whether the federal courts have jurisdic-
tion in such cases has split the circuits. 55
The recent cases raising jurisdictional issues fall into several distinct
factual patterns, and a review of these cases will help clarify the nature
and scope of the legal disputes on jurisdiction grounds: (1) American pur-
chasers of price-fixed goods sold by foreign cartel participants into the
United States; (2) foreign purchasers buying from American-based cartel
participants; (3) American buyers injured abroad by a foreign conspiracy;
and (4) foreign purchasers injured in foreign transactions by conspirators
in a worldwide cartel affecting both American and foreign markets.
A. AMERICAN PURCHASERS AND FOREIGN CARTEL PARTICIPANTS
SELLING INTO THE UNITED STATES
Under Hartford Fire, a conspiracy hatched entirely abroad is subject to
antitrust scrutiny in the United States where the illegal foreign agreement
''was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in
the United States."'56 The key questions after Hartford Fire are (1)
whether a conspiracy having both foreign and domestic elements is suffi-
ciently "foreign" to activate the domestic "effects" test; and (2) what con-
stitutes "some substantial effect" in the United States.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Dee-K Enterprises, Inc. v. Heveafil,
Sdn. Bhd57 is instructive on the first issue. Dee-K involved a price-fixing
action by two American companies against Southeast Asian producers of
rubber thread.58 Dee-K alleged that the conspiracy was worldwide in
scope and intended to affect United States commerce.5 9 Following an
eight day trial, the jury agreed with Dee-K but also found that "the con-
spiracy had no 'substantial effect' on [American] commerce. '60 The trial
court then entered judgment for the defendants.
international cartels we have uncovered involved a wide range of industries,
including the food and feed additives, graphite electrode, vitamins, construc-
tion, fine arts, and textile industries. These illegal cartels have cost U.S. vic-
tims many hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Victims have included
individual consumers and some of the most well known names in American
business-Coca-Cola, Proctor & Gamble, Tyson Foods, Kellogg, and Nestle,jut to name a few.
R. Hewitt Pate, The DOJ International Antitrust Program-Maintaining Momentum, Ad-
dress Before the American Association Section of Antitrust Law (February 6, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200736.htm.
55. Compare Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 423-24
(5th Cir. 2001) (jurisdiction lacking), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002), with Empagran,
315 F.3d 338 (jurisdiction proper), and Kruman, 284 F.3d 384 (jurisdiction proper).
56. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
57. 299 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002).
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On appeal, Dee-K challenged the trial court's adherence to the legal
standard expressed in Hartford Fire, which gave Dee-K the burden of
proving that the defendant's acts had "some substantial effect in the
United States. ' 61 Dee-K argued that: (1) Hartford Fire was inapposite
because it applied only to cases involving "wholly foreign" commerce and
(2) sales of price-fixed goods into the United States by definition involve
domestic, not foreign commerce because they are "in" United States
commerce. 62 Accordingly, Dee-K urged that it need not prove "substan-
tial effect" in the United States. Rather, it need only meet the more leni-
ent jurisdictional standard used in domestic antitrust cases: "that the
defendant's activity is in itself in interstate commerce, or ... that it has an
effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate
commerce.,
63
The Fourth Circuit rejected the attempt to distinguish Hartford Fire as
involving only wholly foreign commerce. 64 The court pointed out that
Hartford Fire involved three counts of conspiracy; two counts dealt only
with foreign actors, but the third count involved both foreign and domes-
tic conspirators. 65 Notwithstanding the fact that other courts have char-
acterized the Hartford Fire conspiracies as being wholly foreign, the facts
of the case clearly show that the alleged misconduct had both domestic
and foreign elements.66 In so ruling, the court acknowledged that neither
Hartford Fire nor other cases provided definitive guidance on what con-
stitutes "foreign conduct. '67
In addition, the Fourth Circuit rejected Dee-K's argument that the sale
of price-fixed goods by foreign sellers to an American buyer in the
United States by definition involves domestic commerce. The court char-
acterized Dee-K's suggested test as "perilously close to clear conflict with
Hartford Fire."'68 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the "single-
factor test" proposed by Dee-K would open United States courts to a
flood of claims involving "a great variety of foreign conduct. ' 69 The
Fourth Circuit noted that in global conspiracies involving both domestic
and foreign actors, courts have "consistently required" a showing of ef-
fect on United States commerce, even in cases involving price-fixing on
imports.70
61. Id. at 286.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 290.
65. Id. at 289.
66. Id.
67. Id. Hartford Fire does not discuss the definition of foreign conduct but does "give
us some guidance by characterizing certain conduct as foreign." Id.
68. Id. at 291.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id. at 292-93. For example, in In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254
(7th Cir. 1980), the court applied the Alcoa effects test in a case involving a worldwide
conspiracy to fix the price of uranium. Defendants included nine foreign entities and
twenty domestic companies. Even though (1) the domestic participants outnumbered the
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At the same time, the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument
that whether or not a conspiracy was foreign turned solely upon the situs
of the illicit agreement. 71 The court found this approach unduly rigid. It
noted that a standard focused on the situs of the conduct would be at
odds with the Alcoa effects test.72 In addition, the court observed that
this standard would produce the anomalous result of (1) requiring a spe-
cial showing of domestic effects where a conspiracy among domestic sell-
ers doing business in the United States is hatched abroad but carried out
entirely within the United States, and (2) imposing at the same time, no
special requirements where the very same conspiracy among domestic
sellers is hatched at home rather than abroad. 73
The court instead opted for a middle course with a "flexible and [more]
subtle inquiry" in determining whether foreign conduct is involved and a
substantial effect in the United States is required.74 The Fourth Circuit
ruled that in determining whether the Hartford Fire test applies, a court
should be "able to consider the full range of factors that may appropri-
ately affect the exercise of [its] antitrust jurisdiction," including whether
the participants, acts, targets and effects involved in an alleged antitrust
violation are primarily foreign or primarily domestic.75 Applying that
test, the court found that: (1) the agreements were all formed outside the
United States; (2) the agreements targeted a global market; (3) all con-
spirators except two held offices in foreign companies, and the two who
held offices in the American companies also had important roles in
Southeast Asian companies; and (4) all meetings took place outside the
United States.76 While there were sales in the United States to American
consumers and American divisions of the foreign sellers cooperated in
the conspiracy, such links to the United States "are mere drops in the sea
of conduct that occurred in Southeast Asia."'77
Accordingly, the price-fixing conspiracy at issue involved "primarily
foreign conduct." Dee-K therefore had the burden of proving that there
was a substantial effect on United States commerce, but ultimately failed
to carry that burden.
On the second question left in the wake of Hartford Fire-what consti-
tutes some substantial effect on domestic commerce-the post-Hartford
Fire cases have been instructive. As a threshold matter, courts have em-
phasized that it is "the situs of the effect, not the conduct, which is cru-
cial."'78 Thus, the requisite domestic effect may be lacking even if the
foreign conspirators, (2) at least one conspiratorial meeting took place in the United
States, and (3) the United States was a target market, the effects test still applied.
71. Id. at 293.
72. Id. at 294.
73. Id.




78. United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009 (N.D. I11.
2001), affd, 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003).
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conduct originates in the United States or involves American-owned enti-
ties operating overseas. The effect on domestic commerce must be "de-
monstrable"; the antitrust laws would not be "triggered ... by any minor
impact" on the domestic marketplace. 79
In Ferromin International Trade Corp. v. UCAR International Corp.,80
the court held that the substantial effect test was met where plaintiffs
alleged the following effects on the domestic marketplace: "(1) artificial
inflation of graphite electrode prices; (2) artificial limits on the volume of
imported graphite electrodes; (3) an artificial increase in the price of im-
ported steel; (4) an artificial reduction in the price of scrap; and (5) artifi-
cial limits on the volume of graphite electrodes exported from the United
States." 81
In Caribbean Broadcasting Systems, Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC,82
the D.C. Circuit held that monopolistic overcharges imposed on advertis-
ers in the Eastern Caribbean had the requisite domestic effect.83 Courts
have also found the requisite effect where competition has been elimi-
nated or significantly reduced in a given market.84 On the other hand,
the requisite effects have been held missing where (1) the impact of the
allegedly unlawful conduct is felt entirely outside the United States;85 (2)
the domestic effects are speculative, derivative or not demonstrable; 86 (3)
the foreign seller did not transact business in the United States and had
neither intent nor ability to do so;87 and (4) it can be shown that the
prospective domestic customers would not have dealt with foreign sell-
ers.88 Foreign sellers may not bootstrap claims onto the injury suffered
by American exporters.89 Injury to customers and potential customers
abroad and to an American exporting firm was held insufficient to meet
the effect requirement. 90
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that in cases involving world-
wide conspiracies, notably the Auction House Cases91 and the Vitamins
79. Id.
80. 153 F. Supp. 2d 700, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
81. Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
82. 148 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
83. Id. at 1085-86.
84. Richard Becker & Matthew Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust
Law: What is "Direct, Substantial and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect" Under the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 11, 18-19 (2003).
85. United Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009 (N.D. Ill.
2001), aff'd 322 F. 3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003).
86. Id.; McElderry v. Cathay Pac. Airways, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 1071, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (FTAIA requires more than speculative effects); Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet
Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (effect of foreign acts on domestic com-
merce must be more than derivative).
87. United Phosphorus, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1010.
88. Id. at 1012.
89. Id. at 1013.
90. McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1988).
91. See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 401 (2d Cir. 2002).
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Cases,92 the issue of domestic effect is conceded or presumed.
B. FOREIGN PURCHASERS BUYING FROM CONSPIRATORS BASED IN
THE UNITED STATES
The law is a bit clearer where the wrongdoers are American firms en-
gaged in a worldwide price-fixing conspiracy and the victims are foreign
purchasers participating in the United States market. The legislative his-
tory of the FTAIA suggests that foreign purchasers participating in the
domestic marketplace and victimized by price-fixing in that marketplace
enjoy the protection of the United States antitrust laws to the same ex-
tent as domestic purchasers:
The intent of the Sherman and FTCA Act amendments in H.R. 5235
is to exempt from the antitrust laws conduct that does not have the
requisite domestic effects. This test, however, does not exclude all
persons injured abroad from recovering under the antitrust laws of
the United States. A course of conduct in the United States-e.g.,
price fixing not limited to the export market-would affect all pur-
chasers of the target products or services, whether the purchaser is
foreign or domestic. The conduct has the requisite effects within the
United States, even if some purchasers take title abroad or suffer
economic injury abroad. Foreign purchasers should enjoy the pro-
tection of our antitrust laws in the domestic marketplace, just as our
citizens do. Indeed, to deny them this protection could violate the
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties this country has en-
tered into with a number of foreign nations. 93
Thus, Congress contemplated that the IFTAIA effects test would en-
compass conduct committed outside the United States having effects
within the United States as well as conduct committed within the United
States having effects both within and outside the United States.94 Ac-
cordingly, the "critical question is not the nationality of the plaintiff but
the location of the marketplace in which he participated. '95 While the
above-quoted language indicates that, as a general proposition, foreign
and domestic purchasers of price-fixed goods should be treated the same
provided the effects test is met, the fourth sentence qualifies that lan-
guage and states that "the conduct has the requisite effects within the
United States, even if some purchasers take title abroad or suffer eco-
nomic injury abroad," as long as the plaintiff has some participation in
the domestic marketplace. 96 On the other hand, as one court aptly noted,
the legislative history does not provide "that jurisdiction exists if the
plaintiff actually makes the purchase abroad and does not otherwise par-
92. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 344 (D.C. Cir.
2003), reh'g denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19842 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2003).
93. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 10 (citations omitted).
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ticipate in a U.S. market. 97
The court in Ferromin made this precise distinction.98 Ferromin in-
volved a worldwide conspiracy to fix the price of graphite electrodes. The
plaintiffs were foreign entities that had purchased graphite electrodes
from the alleged conspirators, which included some domestic sellers. The
court concluded that purchases by foreigners that had been invoiced in
the United States had the requisite substantial effect on domestic com-
merce.99 On the other hand, those whose purchases had been invoiced
outside the United States "could not have been injured by the anti-com-
petitive prices in the United States marketplace."100 Any injuries suf-
fered by these plaintiffs "were caused by anticompetitive effects in
foreign countries and not in the United States."10' Accordingly, those
claims based on foreign purchases were barred by the FTAIA.
Jurisdiction was upheld in Caribbean Broadcasting System, wherein the
plaintiff, a foreign radio station, alleged that the defendant, a rival radio
station in the Caribbean, had monopolized or attempted to monopolize
the market for English language radio broadcasts in the Eastern Carib-
bean (including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) by preventing the
plaintiff from selling advertising time to United States advertisers.102 The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant falsely represented to advertisers that
the defendant's radio signal reached the entire Eastern Caribbean. 103
Upholding the complaint, the court concluded that the plaintiff had suffi-
ciently alleged anticompetitive effect on American commerce and anti-
trust injury arising from that anticompetitive effect because United States
advertisers were forced to pay higher rates, having been denied the bene-
fit of competition.' 0 4
Similarly, subject matter jurisdiction was upheld in Transnor (Ber-
muda), Ltd. v. BP North American Petroleum.'05 There, a foreign plain-
tiff claimed to have been injured by a conspiracy among defendants to
cause a decline in oil prices on the Brent Oil Market, which the court
concluded was an American market.10 6 The illegal conduct thus had an
anticompetitive effect on the American oil market that gave rise to plain-
tiff's claim.
In both Transnor and Caribbean Broadcasting, the anticompetitive con-
duct, while specifically targeted at foreign entities, had anticompetitive
97. Id.
98. Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
99. Id. at 706.
100. Id. at 705.
101. Id. at 705-06.
102. Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1083.





effects in the domestic marketplace, which formed the basis of the plain-
tiffs' claims. On the other hand, courts have found subject matter juris-
diction lacking where foreign claimants can show no such "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States com-
merce.' 0 7 For example, in Turicentro v. American Airlines, Inc.,l08 the
plaintiffs, travel agents in Central America, alleged that five domestic air
carriers and other foreign carriers conspired to lower commissions paid to
them on travel to various Central American countries. The court held
that the fact that some defendants were American and that some illegal
activities pursuant to the conspiracy may have taken place in the United
States is "irrelevant if the economic consequences are not felt in the
United States economy."' 0 9 The court acknowledged that fixing commis-
sion rates was illegal, but found that the conspiracy targeted foreign
travel agents and involved work performed outside the United States. I 10
Other courts have consistently dismissed foreign-based claims on this
basis.I II
C. UNITED STATES CITIZENS INJURED ABROAD BY
FOREIGN CONSPIRACY
Bank Austria"2 is the paradigm for a third category of cases involving
American citizens injured abroad by a foreign antitrust conspiracy. The
plaintiff, a domiciliary of New York, alleged the defendants, all European
banks, had conspired to charge supra-competitive fees when exchanging
certain currencies that make up the Euro.113 The complaint failed to al-
lege where the currency exchanges occurred, but counsel conceded that
they had all taken place in Europe and not in the United States. 114 The
complaint also failed to describe the scope of the conspiracy. Although
the particular overt acts in question were confined to Europe, the trial
court, facing a motion to dismiss, gave full scope to the complaint and
assumed that the conspiracy was directed at the United States as well as
Europe.115
107. See, e.g., Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2002);
Liamuiga Tours v. Travel Impressions, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 920, 924 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
108. Turicentro, 303 F.3d 293.
109. Id. at 305.
110. Id.
111. See Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986)
("The Sherman Act does not reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the con-
duct has an effect on American commerce."); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heer-
emac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427-28 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002);
McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1988); McElderry v. Cathay
Pacific Airways, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 1071, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). But see MM Global Servs.,
Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 2003 WL 22201083 (D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2003) (presuming anticom-
petitive effect in the United States in an action involving alleged price fixing by an Ameri-
can company and foreign sellers targeted at foreign consumers).
112. Sniado v. Bank Aus., N.A., 174 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
113. Id. at 160.
114. Id. at 163.
115. Id. at 164.
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That assumption by itself, however, did not get the plaintiff out of the
woods. The court noted that the term "conduct" may be viewed narrowly
or broadly.' 6 Under the narrow view, conduct refers to the specific acts
that harmed the plaintiffs.It 7 In Bank Austria, the plaintiff was injured by
exchanges that took place in Europe; and the court concluded that charg-
ing supra-competitive rates for exchanges of European currency in Eu-
rope would fail to meet the "effect" requirements under the narrow view
of the FTAIA. 1 8 The court further observed that a plaintiff would need
to show more than American citizenship to establish jurisdiction.
Under the broader view of conduct, a court would look to the totality
of defendants' acts; here, that conduct "would consist of the entire al-
leged conspiracy to fix fees for exchange of European currencies in Eu-
rope and the United States."119 If the fee-fixing occurred in the United
States, then a reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce
would have been established. However, the court declined to choose be-
tween the two definitions of conduct, ruling that plaintiff had failed to
bring itself within § 6a(2) of the FTAIA.120
D. FOREIGN PURCHASER BUYING IN A FOREIGN MARKET ALLEGING
A WORLDWIDE CONSPIRACY AFFECTING BOTH FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC MARKETS
It is the fourth subset of cases that has generated the hottest debate
and has created a split between the Second 121 and Fifth Circuits,122 with
the D.C. Circuit 12 3 somewhere in between. The focus of the debate has
been the proper construction of § 6a(2) of the FTAIA. Specifically, the




119. Id. at 165.
120. Id. Section 6a(2) of the FTAIA requires that the "effect [on United States com-
merce] give rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of the Sherman Act." Id.
at 166. The court concluded that § 6a(2) requires that the alleged anticompetitive effect on
American commerce must give rise to its claim. Id. The court ruled that a plaintiff injured
abroad by an antitrust violation that causes an anticompetitive effect in the United States
can sue under the Sherman Act if and only if the overseas injury is the result of anticompe-
titive effects in the American market. Id. At the same time, the antitrust laws do not
apply to a claim by a plaintiff injured overseas by a price-fixing scheme in a foreign market,
"even if the same defendants engage in price-fixing affecting an American market." The
plaintiff in Bank Austria did not and could not assert that its claim arose out of any an-
ticompetitive effect on domestic commerce.
121. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
122. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
123. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La Roche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g
denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19042 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2003). In addition, the Seventh
Circuit appears poised to join the Second and D.C. Circuits in their construction of § 6a(2).
See Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2003)
("Although we need not come to a definitive resolution of the issue in this case, the United




reasonably foreseeable anticompetitive effect on United States commerce
that creates the court's jurisdiction must be the same effect that gives rise
to the claim by a particular plaintiff or whether, once the requisite domes-
tic effect can be shown, the court has subject matter jurisdiction irrespec-
tive of whether that domestic effect itself gives rise to the claim of this
particular plaintiff. Put another way, must the domestic effect give rise to
"the" claim or simply "a" claim.
1. The Fifth Circuit
In Den Norske Stats Qljeselskap As v. Heeremac Vof ("Statoil") a Nor-
wegian oil company, conducting business exclusively in the North Sea
brought an antitrust claim against providers of heavy-lift barge ser-
vices.12 4 The plaintiff Statoil claimed that (1) the defendants agreed to fix
bids and allocate customers for heavy-lift barge services in the Gulf of
Mexico; and (2) the conspiracy not only led purchasers of heavy-lift ser-
vices in the Gulf of Mexico to pay inflated prices, but also led American
consumers to pay supra-competitive prices for oil. 125 Statoil contended
that the market for heavy-lift services was global. 126 While acknowledg-
ing its injuries were suffered outside the United States, it contended the
injury suffered in the North Sea was a "necessary prerequisite to" and
was the quid pro quo for, the injury suffered in the domestic market. 127
The trial court concluded that Statoil had neither sufficiently alleged anti-
competitive effect on the domestic market nor did any effect on domestic
commerce give rise to its claims. 128
The Fifth Circuit concluded that domestic effect had been sufficiently
alleged, but dismissed Statoil's claim because the alleged effect on United
States commerce-here, "higher prices paid by American companies for
heavy-lift services in the Gulf of Mexico"-did not give rise to the claim
asserted by Statoil against the defendants for alleged anticompetitive con-
duct in the North Sea. 129 Citing the language of § 2 of the FTAIA, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that "the effect on United States commerce-in this
case, the higher prices paid by United States companies for heavy-lift ser-
vices in the Gulf of Mexico-must give rise to the claim that Statoil as-
serts.' 130 Put another way, Statoil needed to show that its injury
stemmed from the effect of higher prices for heavy-lift services in the
Gulf of Mexico, but the higher prices paid by American companies for
heavy-lift services in the Gulf did not give rise to Statoil's claim that it
paid inflated prices for services in the North Sea. Accordingly, Statoil's
claim was barred by the FTAIA. It was not enough that the plaintiff's
124. 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
125. Id. at 426-29.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 427.
128. Id. at 426.
129. Id. at 427.
130. Id.
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injury in the North Sea was closely related to the domestic harm caused
by anticompetitive conduct in the Gulf of Mexico.
In so holding, the appellate court specifically rejected Statoil's argu-
ment that the requirement of § 2 of the FTAIA that the domestic effect
must give rise to a claim under the antitrust laws is met where defendant's
domestic conduct-e.g., bid rigging in the Gulf of Mexico-gives rise to a
claim.13' The majority concluded that Statoil's interpretation (1) was
contrary to the plain language of the FTAIA; (2) would flood American
courts with claims by foreign plaintiffs who have no commercial ties to
the United States and whose injuries were not suffered in the United
States; and (3) was an overly expansive reading of the extraterritorial
reach of the antitrust laws that was never intended by Congress. 132
The Fifth Circuit also found that the legislative history of the FTAIA
shows that Congress intended to exclude wholly foreign transactions,
such as the contract between Statoil and foreign defendants for services
in the North Sea, from the reach of the antitrust laws: "A transaction
between two foreign firms, even if American owned, should not, merely
by virtue of the American ownership come within the reach of our anti-
trust laws .... It is thus clear that wholly foreign transactions are cov-
ered by the [FTAIA], but that import transactions are not."133
Finally, the majority pointed out that Statoil had failed to cite even one
case supporting its position that a foreign plaintiff injured in a foreign
market may sue in a United States court where the anticompetitive effect
on domestic commerce did not give rise to the plaintiff's claim.134
Judge Higginbotham filed a vigorous dissent. Taking issue with the ma-
jority, he stated that § 6a(2) requires only that the anticompetitive effect
of a defendant's conduct give rise to a claim; the statute does not say, as
the majority suggests, that the anticompetitive effects of defendant's con-
duct give rise to the plaintiffs claim.135 Thus, he found the majority's
construction was contrary to the literal text of the statute.' 36
Having concluded that the text of the FTAIA does not compel the ma-
jority's construction of § 6a(2), Judge Higginbotham turned to other con-
struction aids to determine the meaning of the FTAIA. 137 He found
support for his view in the legislative history of the FTAIA. He noted
that the FTAIA was enacted as part of the Export Trading Company Act
of 1982 and served to exempt exporting from antitrust scrutiny, "not to
limit the liability of participants in transnational conspiracies that affect
United States commerce.' 38 In short, the FTAIA was intended to pro-
vide a safe harbor for American exporters, not international price
131. Id.
132. Id. at 427-30.
133. Id. at 428.
134. Id. at 429.
135. Id. at 431-33.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 431-37.




Judge Higginbotham further reasoned that under the majority view an
American cartel that fixes prices worldwide would be subject to antitrust
suits by plaintiffs around the world, but foreign cartels fixing prices
worldwide would be subject to suit under the Clayton Act only by plain-
tiffs injured in American commerce. 140 In other words, the majority
would transform a safe harbor for American exporters into a safe haven
for foreign cartels restraining commerce in the United States.' 4 1
Judge Higginbotham also found that the majority position would im-
pair the deterrent function of the treble damages remedy.
Conspirators facing antitrust liability only to plaintiffs injured by
their conspiracy's effects on the United States may not be deterred
from restraining trade in the United States. A worldwide price-fix-
ing scheme could sustain monopoly prices in the United States even
in the face of such liability if it could cross-subsidize its American
operations with profits from abroad. Unless persons injured by the
conspiracy's effects on foreign commerce could also bring antitrust
suits against the conspiracy, the conspiracy could remain profitable
and undeterred. 142
Judge Higginbotham noted that in Pfizer, the Supreme Court upheld
the standing of foreign governments which had purchased price-fixed
goods in the United States from an allegedly American-based cartel oper-
ating worldwide to sue for treble damages. 143 While he acknowledged
that Pfizer was factually distinguishable from the instant case, he none-
theless found its logic compelling and concluded that the majority reading
of section 6a(2) would undermine deterrence.' 44 He reasoned that if for-
eign plaintiffs could not sue a cartel based in the United States, a cartel
would not be deterred from operating in the United States because a
worldwide price fixing scheme may be able to sustain supra-competitive
prices in the United States, notwithstanding potential treble damage ex-
posure, if the cartel could cross-subsidize American operations (and po-
tential losses in treble damage actions) with foreign profits.1 45 Thus, by
excluding foreign buyers as plaintiffs, courts would permit cartels to re-
main both profitable and undeterred. 46
Judge Higginbotham found support for this approach in the legislative
history of the FTAIA, which states that:
the FTAIA does not exclude all persons injured abroad from recov-
ering under the anti-trust laws of the United States. A course of
conduct in the United States e.g., price fixing not limited to the ex-
139. Id. at 431-37.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 434-35.
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port market-would affect all purchases of the target domestic prod-
uct or services, whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic. The
conduct has the requisite effects in the United States, even if some
purchasers take title abroad or suffer economic injury abroad. 147
Accordingly, the legislative history suggests that plaintiffs suffering injury
abroad are not precluded by the FTAIA.
2. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit, relying heavily on Judge Higginbotham's dissent in
Statoil, reached the opposite result in Kruman v. Christie's International
PLC.148 Kruman was a treble damages action that arose out of the
worldwide conspiracy between the world's two leading auction houses,
Christie's and Sotheby's, to fix the amount of seller's commissions or
buyer's premium paid by successful bidders at auction.149 It was one of
many private actions filed after word leaked that Christie's had confessed
to price fixing and had sought leniency from the Antitrust Division. In
Kruman, eight plaintiffs, four American and four foreign, sued in the
Southern District of New York.150 All transactions upon which damages
were based took place outside the United States, although the plaintiffs
alleged that part of the conspiracy had been hatched in the United States
and that overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy had been committed
in the United States. 15 1
a. The District Court
Judge Kaplan granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the
grounds that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking under the FTAIA.
He succinctly stated the issue as follows: "The fundamental question here
is whether a transnational price fixing conspiracy that affects commerce
both in the United States and in other countries inevitably gives persons
injured abroad in transactions otherwise unconnected with the United
States a remedy under our antitrust laws."
His answer was equally succinct: "Unless the Court is to impute to
Congress an intention to establish an antitrust regimen to cover the
world, the answer must be 'no.'" 52
The court found that this case presented precisely the kind of situation
that the FTAIA is intended to exempt.153 Citing the legislative history of
the FTAIA, the court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction would
attach "only where the offending conduct had 'direct, substantial and rea-
sonably foreseeable effects' in the United States;" and that "the effects
147. Id. at 436.
148. 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
149. Id. at 389.
150. Id. at 390-91.
151. Id. at 391.




giving rise to jurisdiction also are the basis for the alleged injury."'1 54
In analyzing whether the defendants' "conduct" had the requisite do-
mestic "effects," the court acknowledged that the term "conduct" is
vague and conceded that the plaintiffs could properly contend that a sub-
stantial part of the defendants' conduct took place in the United States.
The court concluded, however, that proper usage of the term "conduct"
was beside the point. 55 The key for the court was identifying the precise
acts that caused injury in this case-imposition of supra-competitive
charges for auction services. 156 Some of those acts occurred in the
United States; others, and those which were specifically complained
about, took place abroad.
The court reasoned that the United States could be bringing a criminal
action to punish a conspiracy that took place in substantial part in the
United States. 57 The United States could also provide civil remedies for
injuries caused by conspiratorial acts that both occurred here and had
effects here.' 58 However, where overt acts occurred outside the United
States, only those acts that have direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effects in the United States that caused the injuries for which
relief is sought would be within the jurisdiction of American courts. That
did not occur in this case because (1) the alleged conspiratorial acts did
not have the requisite effect in the United States; and (2) the domestic
effects purporting to give rise to jurisdiction (here conspiratorial meetings
and sales to others not now before the court) are not the basis of the
injury claimed by the plaintiffs presently before the court. Instead, the
plaintiffs brought a claim concerning overcharges on sales made outside
of the United States.
b. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Kaplan and ruled that
"the complaint describes conduct that has the requisite 'effect' on domes-
tic commerce under the FTAIA to be regulated by the Sherman Act.'1 59
The court held that (1) the FIAIA did not alter, but merely codified, its
earlier decision in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Associa-
tion; and (2) the trial court erred in holding that, under the FTAIA, the
plaintiff must show not only anticompetitive effects in the United States
but also that the "effects giving rise to jurisdiction also are the basis for
the alleged injury"; that is, only plaintiffs who suffer injury from that do-
mestic effect may sue. 160 The appellate court categorically rejected the
trial court's position that plaintiffs injured abroad by anticompetitive con-
duct directed at foreign markets are barred from suit under the FTAIA,




158. Id. at 625-26.
159. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2002).
160. Id. at 389-90.
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even if that conduct has hurt the competitiveness of the domestic
market. 161
In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit ruled that the FTfAIA
did not alter but merely codified the decisional law of the Second Cir-
cuit 162 and that under its earlier ruling in National Bank of Canada, sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over claims of foreign plaintiffs was proper. 163
Plaintiff National Bank of Canada (National Bank) was a Canadian cor-
poration that had been created from the amalgamation of two other Ca-
nadian banks, Provincial Bank and Banque Canadienne Nationale.
Defendant Interbank Card Association (Interbank) was a licensor of
Master Card credit cards. 164 Provincial Bank, National Bank's predeces-
sor, had been an Interbank licensee. Provincial Bank attempted to trans-
fer its Master Card license to National Bank. 165 Interbank and one of its
licensees, Bank of Montreal, objected to the license transfer unless Na-
tional Bank would agree to dispose of the Visa credit card business which
it had inherited from Banque Canadienne Nationale. 166 National Bank
was unable to sell the Visa business at an acceptable price. Interbank
then terminated its Master Card license, and National Bank sued in the
Southern District of New York, alleging that its termination by Interbank
constituted an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act by excluding National Bank from competition for Canadian
credit cardholders and merchant accounts. 1
67
Affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that the plaintiff failed "to make clear the linkage, if any,
between the behavior objected to and any anticompetitive consequences
to United States commerce.' 68 The court emphasized that subject mat-
ter jurisdiction "is not supported by every conceivable repercussion of the
action objected to on United States commerce."'1 69 Rather "[o]nly those
injuries to United States commerce which reflect the anticompetitive ef-
fect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation constitute effects sufficient to confer jurisdiction.' 170
The court in Kruman restated this holding: "anticompetitive conduct
directed at foreign markets is only regulated by the Sherman Act if it has
the 'effect' of causing injury to domestic commerce by (1) reducing com-
petitiveness of a domestic market; or (2) making possible anticompetitive
161. Id.
162. Id. at 389-90, 401 (noting that the legislative history of the FTAIA cites Nat'l Bank
of Can. with approval).
163. Id. at 401 (citing Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
164. Nat'l Bank of Can., 666 F.2d at 7.
165. Id. at 8.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 9.




conduct directed at domestic commerce."'1 71 The court concluded that
the defendants' alleged conduct would confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the federal courts under either prong of National Bank of Canada:
Conduct meeting the first prong of the National Bank of Canada test
would clearly have an effect on domestic commerce and give rise to a
claim under the Sherman Act because a plaintiff would have to show
that such conduct was directed at both domestic and foreign markets
and actually reduced the competitiveness of domestic markets.
Moreover, conduct meeting the second prong would satisfy the re-
quirements of subsection 2 of the FTAIA because it would have the
effect on domestic commerce of making possible anticompetitive
conduct that "gives rise to a claim" under the Sherman Act. 172
Having found that the FTAIA does not change existing case law in the
Second Circuit, the appellate court further held that the court below had
erred in ruling that the FTAIA permits suit, insofar as was relevant to the
case before it, only where the conduct complained of had "direct substan-
tial and reasonably foreseeable effects in the United States and the ef-
fects giving rise to jurisdiction also are the basis for the alleged injury."' 173
Specifically, the court ruled that Judge Kaplan had misconstrued three
key terms in the FTAIA: (1) "injury"; (2) "conduct"; and (3) "effect...
that gives rise to a claim."' 74
The Second Circuit ruled that the trial court had erred by interpreting
the FTAIA as imposing a broader plaintiff's injury requirement than can
be supported by the text of the statute. 175 The trial court had concluded
that foreign plaintiffs must show not only anticompetitive effect on do-
mestic commerce, but also that the same anticompetitive effect conferring
jurisdiction gives rise to their claims. 176
The appellate court rejected the corollary to the trial court's holding
that plaintiffs injured abroad by anticompetitive conduct targeted at for-
eign markets are barred from suing under the antitrust laws, even if that
conduct had hurt the competitiveness of domestic markets. First, the
court noted that the term "injury" is used in the FTAIA only once and
then only in reference to conduct affecting export markets. 77 The Act
provides that where conduct affects export trade with foreign nations, a
plaintiff's antitrust claim is limited "to such conduct only for injury to
export business in the United States."'178 Accordingly, the injury require-
ment does not apply across the board to the FTAIA, but rather only to a
small subset involving export-related conduct. Such an interpretation
171. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 2002).
172. Id. at 401.
173. Id. at 389.
174. Id. at 396-401.
175. Id. at 396-98.
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would, in the view of the appellate court, render the injury language in
the FTAIA superfluous.
Second, and more fundamentally, the Second Circuit concluded the in-
terpretation of the FTAIA below would "conflate the FTAIA with the
Clayton Act."'1 79 The court drew a sharp divide between the Clayton Act
and the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act deals with the plaintiff's right to
sue, i.e., whether it has suffered injury. The Sherman Act, on the other
hand, deals with defendants and substantive standards prohibiting certain
conduct. Put another way, "The substantive provisions of the Sherman
Act determine what conduct by the defendant is actionable. The Clayton
Act determines what injury a plaintiff must suffer in order to bring
suit." 180
According to the court, the conduct and injury requirements of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts operate independently.' 81 The court ob-
served that it is possible that conduct may violate the Sherman Act and
not be actionable under the Clayton Act because no one suffered in-
jury.' 82 At the same time, a plaintiff who has not yet suffered injury may
enjoin a violation of the Sherman Act. 183 In other words, a private plain-
tiff's inability to establish injury from a Sherman Act violation only con-
fines the available remedy to injunctive relief; moreover, the Sherman
Act itself empowers the government to enjoin antitrust violations even
where no plaintiff has suffered injury.
The district court had held that conduct under the FTAIA refers to the
"precise acts that caused injury," in this case, the imposition of
overcharges at auction.184 The Second Circuit disagreed. In line with the
foregoing analytical dichotomy drawn between the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act, the court ruled that the FTAIA-an amendment to the
Sherman Act-focuses on a defendant's conduct and not on a plaintiff's
injury.185 According to the Second Circuit, the "FTAIA does not regu-
late which plaintiffs can bring suit under the Clayton Act and it would be
inappropriate to import the element of injury from the Clayton Act and
graft it onto the FTAIA."'1 86 "Conduct" under the FTAIA therefore re-
fers only to acts illegal under the Sherman Act. The illegal act in this case
was not the imposition of overcharges, but the formation of the conspir-
acy; and that conduct occurred in the United States. 87
The trial court had held that the anticompetitive effects that give rise to
subject matter jurisdiction must also be the basis for a plaintiff's alleged
injury under § 6a(2) of the FTAIA.188 The court of appeals disagreed.
179. Id. at 397.
180. Id. at 398.
181. Id. at 397.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 398-99.
185. Id. at 398.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 399.
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First, as discussed above, 189 the appellate court reasoned that the inter-
pretation below would necessarily mean that the FTAIA modified prior
case law; the court stated categorically that this was not the case. 190 Sec-
ond, the trial court's interpretation would inappropriately impact the con-
cept of injury a plaintiff must suffer to bring a Clayton Act action when
the FTAIA refers only to the Sherman Act. 191 The statutory language
requires only that the "effect" on domestic commerce violate the Sher-
man Act, and a violation of the Sherman Act is complete upon the agree-
ment to fix prices.' 92 While the court acknowledged that a private
plaintiff must prove overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to establish
a right to money damages, it noted that the federal government is em-
powered under the Sherman Act to enjoin Sherman Act violations re-
gardless of whether a private plaintiff has been injured.1 93
Third, the interpretation by the district court would effectively rewrite
§ 6a(2). That section states that the "anticompetitive effect gives rise to a
claim under [the Sherman Act]."' 94 The court below would construe "a"
claim as "the plaintiff's" claim. Invoking the plain meaning rule, the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the "effect" on domestic commerce under
§ 6a(2) need not be the basis for the plaintiff's injury; it must only violate
the substantive standards of the Sherman Act.195
Applying these principles, the court of appeals found that the plaintiffs
had alleged sufficient effect on domestic commerce by averring that the
domestic price-fixing agreement could only have succeeded with the for-
eign price-fixing agreement. The offending conduct could be described in
two ways.1 96 The illegal conduct in question might be characterized as an
agreement to fix prices in both the foreign and domestic markets. The
conduct has an effect on domestic commerce because it includes acts
targeted at a domestic market. 97 Alternatively, the offending conduct
may be described as an agreement to fix prices in a foreign auction mar-
ket that made possible an agreement to fix prices in the domestic auction
market.1 98 Because the foreign agreements made domestic price-fixing
agreements possible, the effect of the foreign agreements gives rise to a
claim under the Sherman Act. The court concluded that the "unambigu-
ous text" of the FTAIA would support jurisdiction on the record before
it.199
189. See supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
190. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 399.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 399-400.
194. Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 401.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 389.
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E. EMPAGRAN
The D.C. Circuit's ruling in Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La Roche
Ltd.200 is perhaps the most detailed treatment of FTAIA issues. This case
involved private treble damages actions by foreign purchasers of alleged
price-fixed vitamins in the wake of Justice Department prosecutions of an
international cartel in vitamins and vitamin products. The plaintiffs al-
leged that the conspiracy was world-wide in scope and affected virtually
every market where the defendants operated.20 1 They further alleged
that the defendants' unlawful conduct had adverse effects in the United
States and elsewhere that caused injury to the plaintiffs in connection
with vitamin purchases abroad. 20 2 The district court granted the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FTAIA. The court of appeals reversed. 20 3
At issue before the D.C. Circuit was the same question that had di-
vided the Second and Fifth Circuits: whether § 6a(2) of the FTAIA re-
quires that foreign plaintiffs show the requisite anticompetitive effects on
United States commerce and that the domestic effects giving rise to juris-
diction are also the basis of their claim (Statoil); or whether foreign plain-
tiffs need only show that the defendants' conduct gives rise to "a" claim
cognizable under the Sherman Act and not "the" claim which the foreign
plaintiffs assert (Kruman). The D.C. Circuit, nevertheless, declined to
take sides. It found the Fifth Circuit's view of the FTAIA "overly rigid"
and the Second Circuit's position as reaching "too far in its view of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. '20 4
The D.C. Circuit instead sought to stake out a middle ground. Ac-
knowledging that § 6a(2) "does not plainly resolve this case," the court
held that where the anticompetitive conduct has the requisite adverse ef-
fect on domestic commerce, foreign plaintiffs injured solely by that con-
duct's effect on domestic commerce may sue under the FTAIA.20 5
Foreign plaintiffs must also show that the anticompetitive conduct itself
violates the Sherman Act and that the conduct's adverse effects on do-
mestic commerce give rise to "a claim" by someone, not necessarily the
foreign plaintiffs. 206 Because the plaintiffs alleged that the cartel caused
anticompetitive effects in the United States giving rise to antitrust claims
by parties injured in the United States by transactions occurring in the
United States, the court upheld jurisdiction.20 7 The court based its hold-
ing on a literal reading of the FTAIA and its statutory history and in light
of the "underlying policies of deterrence emanating from the Supreme
200. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman La Roche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), reh'g
denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 19042 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2003).
201. Id. at 340.
202. Id.
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Court's decision in Pfizer. '208
1. Statutory Language
First, the court focused on the language of the FTAIA itself. The ma-
jority concluded that the "gives rise to a claim" language does not resolve
the question of whether "a claim" means this plaintiffs claim.209 The
court rejected the argument that the Fifth Circuit's restrictive construc-
tion of "gives rise to a claim" would render superfluous the proviso to
§ 6a(l)(B) that if the Sherman Act applies only because the conduct "af-
fects export commerce or export commerce with foreign nations of a per-
son engaged in such trade of commerce in the United States," it applies
"to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United
States.12 10 It held that the language could mean that "the Sherman Act
does not extend to all injury sustained by such a person as a result of the
anticompetitive conduct, but, rather, only to injury to his export business
sustained within the United States."'211 As construed, the proviso would
bar an exporter from suing for damages incurred to its export business
outside the United States.
The court also criticized Kruman's holding that "gives rise to a claim"
means only that the domestic effect of a defendant's conduct need "vio-
late the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act. '212 It found that
Kruman gave "short shrift" to the "gives rise to a claim" language in the
statute.2 13 Accordingly, more than a violation which could be addressed
by a government action was required; but the court stopped short of say-
ing that the domestic effect of the illegal conduct must give rise to the
foreign plaintiff's claim. Rather, it said that (1) the anticompetitive con-
duct must violate the Sherman Act; (2) the conduct's harmful effect on
domestic commerce must give rise to a claim by someone; and (3) that
someone need not be the foreign plaintiff before the court. 214
2. Structure of the FTAIA
Second, the D.C. Circuit parsed the structural argument set forth by
the Second Circuit in Kruman.215 The court rejected as "plausible but
ultimately unconvincing" the Second Circuit's thesis that the FTAIA
amends the Sherman Act and that the Sherman Act addresses only con-
duct not remedy. 21 6 The court noted that the Clayton Act confers a cause
of action upon those injured by a violation of the Sherman Act. It also




211. Id. at 348-49.
212. Id. at 349.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 350.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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referred both to prohibited conduct and injury and imported concepts
from the Sherman and Clayton Acts "in making the nexus of 'conduct,'
'effect' and 'claim' key to the FrAIA. '' 217
The court observed that the decision in Kruman was overly expansive
in scope.218 It found that "a claim" means a private action; it is not suffi-
cient that a violation of the Sherman Act gives rise to a claim by the
government.2 19 The court further elaborated that the phrase "a claim"
means giving rise to a private party's claim for damages or equitable re-
lief.22 0 This hurdle is satisfied if the foreign plaintiff alleges that a person
"has suffered actual or threatened injury as a result of the U.S. effect of
the defendant's violation of the Sherman Act."'221
3. Legislative History
Third, the court of appeals turned to the legislative history of the
FTAIA. The court acknowledged that while there are isolated statements
in the legislative history of the FTAIA to support the Fifth Circuit's re-
strictive view of the statute, much of the legislative history supports the
Second Circuit's less restrictive view. 222 Moreover, in the court's mind,
the isolated statements in the legislative history that support the more
restrictive view neither designate nor preclude the less restrictive view. 223
4. Deterrence
Fourth, the appellate court explored the interrelationship between ju-
risdiction under the FTAIA and the deterrent function of the antitrust
laws. The heart of the court's rationale was that the Supreme Court's
decision in Pfizer supported exercise of subject matter jurisdiction on the
facts before it.224 As discussed above, 225 Pfizer involved claims by for-
eign governments in the Antibiotics Antitrust Litigation.2 26 The question
before the Supreme Court was whether a foreign government was a "per-
son" within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act and hence enti-
tled to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws. 227 In holding that
foreign governments could sue for treble damages, the court emphasized
the deterrent function of the treble damage remedy and how deterrence
would be enhanced if foreign plaintiffs victimized by illegal conduct could
sue. 228 On the other hand, deterrence would be severely undermined if
foreign plaintiffs were barred from suit, and price-fixers could use pro-
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ceeds from foreign cartels to subsidize domestic cartel activity, thereby
permitting the cartel to "remain profitable and undeterred. '2 29
The D.C. Circuit noted that the legislative history of the FTAIA cites
Pfizer with approval and embraces the Supreme Court's concern that bar-
ring foreign claims in some instances may impair the deterrent function of
the antitrust laws: "As the Supreme Court pointed out in Pfizer ... to
deny foreigners a recovery could under some circumstances so limit the
deterrent effect of United States antitrust law that defendants would con-
tinue to violate our laws, willingly risking the smaller amount of damages
payable only to injured domestic persons. '230 The court then concluded
that Pfizer supported its argument that the legislative history, on balance,
supports a less restrictive reading of § 6a(2) and the exercise of jurisdic-
tion on the record before it.231
IV. A CRITIQUE
A. "GIvEs RISE TO A CLAIM"
Construction of the phrase "gives rise to a claim" in § 6a(2) of the
FTAIA has proven most troublesome for courts. Some courts have done
better than others, but no court has been perfect.
1. Fifth Circuit
The most interesting and doctrinally pure debate on § 6a(2) has been
the face-off between the majority and Judge Higginbotham's dissent in
Statoil. Both sides rely on the same authorities-the language of the
FTAIA and its legislative history and case law-yet come to polar oppo-
site results. The majority's view is at odds with the statutory language but
probably consistent with the will of Congress. The dissent's view is con-
sistent with a literal reading of the statute but probably inconsistent with
the drafters' intent.
Judge Higginbotham's dissent, while well-written and skillfully argued,
is ultimately wide of the mark. Although he criticizes the majority for
relying on presumptions as a tool for interpretation, he utilizes the same
technique. The centerpiece of his argument is based on a canon of statu-
tory interpretation-the plain meaning rule-and is ultimately uncon-
vincing. First, there is nothing "plain" about the wording of the FTAIA;
it is simply a poorly drafted statute. Given that fact, something more in
the statutory language beyond the purported plain meaning of the word
"a" is needed, but Judge Higginbotham offers none. Nor should the plain
meaning rule dictate the results here. The plain meaning rule is a canon
of statutory interpretation designed to assist courts in construing statutes;
it is a tool, not a trump card. Yet, Judge Higginbotham asserts that the
plain meaning rule trumps the majority's arguments.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 356 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 10).
231. Id. at 358.
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Moreover, his approach is at odds with formidable Supreme Court au-
thority. In Standard Oil,232 the Supreme Court construed the phrase
"every contract, combination ... or conspiracy" contained in § 1 of the
Sherman Act.233 A literal construction of this phrase would mean that
every contract involving interstate or international commerce would vio-
late § 1, since the very essence of a contract is to restrain the parties
thereto in some way. Writing for the Court, Justice White recognized
that Congress could not possibly have intended that the word "every" be
construed literally.234 Justice White wrote that Congress intended under
§ 1 to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.235 Thus, the plain
meaning rule may not be invoked to construe the antitrust laws in a way
that is at odds with the intent of Congress.
Second, if Judge Higginbotham is right, Congress, by using "a" rather
than "the," intended to abolish the doctrine of antitrust injury in cases
involving foreign plaintiffs. Given the fact that Congress, by enacting the
FIAIA, was seeking to limit-not expand-subject matter jurisdiction,
that argument is not persuasive. Nowhere in the legislative history is
there any suggestion that the FTAIA was intended to modify the antitrust
injury doctrine, enunciated five years before by the Supreme Court, so as
to facilitate claims by foreign plaintiffs based on foreign transactions. It is
inconceivable that Congress, in enacting the F-IAIA with the view of lim-
iting jurisdiction over foreign claims, intended to create a broad excep-
tion to rule in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.236 The
Brunswick case was handed down in 1977.237 The Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff in a treble damage action must establish more than a viola-
tion of an antitrust statute and injury flowing from that violation; a plain-
tiff must prove "antitrust injury"-i.e., "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the
defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by
the violation. '238
Indeed, the legislature made clear that it had no intention of altering
the concept of antitrust injury. 239 The district court in In re Copper Anti-
trust Litigation, although ultimately reversed on the issue of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, was on target with its observation that: "It is not
reasonable to think that Congress wanted to provide a forum for mostly
foreign plaintiffs who were injured abroad by effects felt abroad and not
in American markets, even if the wrongdoer's conduct produced other
232. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1, 60-71 (1911).
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
234. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
235. Id.
236. See Brief of Amici Curiae United States and Federal Trade Commission, Em-
pagran, 315 F.3d 338 (No. 01-7115) (FTAIA does not abrogate rule that plaintiff must
suffer antitrust injury), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200800.htm.
237. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
238. Id. at 489.
239. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 11.
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anticompetitive effects in the United States. '240
The only reason for including § 6a(2) in the FTAIA is to make clear
that foreign claimants, like domestic claimants, must show antitrust in-
jury. 241 Otherwise, the clause is superfluous. Judge Higginbotham's at-
tempt to give independent meaning to § 6a(2) is unavailing. He argues
that § 6a(2) requires that foreign commerce have an effect-apparently
procompetitive or anticompetitive-and that § 6a(2) removes subject
matter jurisdiction over conspiracies that are beneficial or benign. 242
That reading is unnecessarily strained. Antitrust statutes do not prohibit
or even address conduct that is beneficial or benign. The most logical
reading of § 6a(1) and § 6a(2) is that § 6a(1) requires that anticompetitive
effects be "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable;" and § 6a(2)
requires that anticompetitive acts that create a basis for subject matter
jurisdiction be the same acts which gave rise to the claim asserted.
In addition to relying on the "plain language" of the statute, Judge Hig-
ginbotham argues that foreign purchasers injured by a domestic cartel
must be treated the same as domestic purchasers victimized by the same
cartel, lest the deterrent function of the antitrust laws be undermined. 243
It is true that the legislative history of the FTAIA supports the proposi-
tion that there should be no distinction between foreign and domestic
purchasers who have participated in the domestic arena and who have
been victimized by cartel behavior, provided the effects test is met. How-
ever, the same House Report also provides that "the conduct has the req-
uisite effects in the United States even if some purchasers take title
abroad or suffer economic injury abroad. '2 44 As Judge Motz pointed out
in Microsoft: "[i]t does not say that jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff actu-
ally makes the purchase abroad and does not otherwise participate in a
U.S. market. '245 Thus, there is a difference between a foreign purchaser
who transacts business in the United States but takes title and thus suffers
injury abroad and a foreign purchaser who has no involvement in the
American marketplace, transacts business abroad, takes title abroad, and
suffers injury abroad. As Judge Motz further explained:
Although this distinction may seem legalistic, it is significant. The
concept that a purchaser may take title or suffer injury at a place
different from the place where he engages in the sales transaction is
well known to the law. However, by using language embodying that
concept, the legislative history reflects that Congress was proceeding
from the premise that, wherever title is taken or economic injury is
suffered, at least some aspect of the sales transaction took place in
240. In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875, 887 (W.D. Wis. 2000), rev'd sub
nom., Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 325 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2003).
241. See Brief of Amici Curiae, Empagran (No. 01-7115) (foreign claimants, like do-
mestic claimants, must show antitrust injury).
242. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 432-33 (5th Cir.
2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
243. Id. at 434-35, 439.
244. H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 10.
245. In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Md. 2001).
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the United States. Any doubt on that score is resolved by the next-
to-last quoted sentence which states that "[f]oreign purchasers
should enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the domestic mar-
ketplace, just as our citizens do." Nothing is said about protecting
foreign purchasers in foreign markets.
I therefore have no difficulty in concluding that foreign consumers
who have not participated in any way in the U.S. market have no
right to institute a Sherman Act claim.2 46
While antitrust deterrence is important, the question of deterrence is
legally distinct from the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject
matter jurisdiction must be established first before courts can address de-
terrence concerns.
2. Second Circuit
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit in construing § 6a(2) got it dead
wrong. Reduced to its lowest terms, the Second Circuit's rationale for
reversal turns on two points: (1) the trial court erred by importing Clay-
ton Act concepts of injury into the Sherman Act; and (2) the trial court's
construction of § 6a(2) of the FTAIA is contrary to the plain meaning of
the Act. Neither argument can withstand scrutiny.
The Second Circuit calls to task the decision below because it would
"conflate the Clayton Act with the FTAIA. '' 247 The court's analysis of
the FTAIA turns on the dubious proposition that the Clayton and Sher-
man Acts are separate statutory schemes-the Clayton Act remedial and
the Sherman Act substantive-and never the twain shall meet. This anal-
ysis is riddled with error.
First, the construct is both artificial and without support in case law.
The court relied on the fact that the Clayton Act contains remedial provi-
sions and the Sherman Act does not. While that is true now, it was not
always so; the conclusions that the court drew from this fact are off track.
There is no legal basis for the assertion that the Sherman and Clayton
Acts are separate statutes and separate legal schemes; instead, the oppo-
site is true. The Clayton and Sherman Acts are to be read in pari
materia.248 It is a matter of historic accident that remedial provisions of
the antitrust laws are now housed in the Clayton Act.
The court's position is refuted by the fact that the Sherman Act as orig-
inally enacted contained a treble damages provision substantially identi-
cal to the one now contained in the Clayton Act that applied to Sherman
Act claims. In 1914, § 4 of the Clayton Act was enacted to provide a
treble damage remedy for any person injured "by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws."' 249 From its inception, § 4 of the Clayton
246. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
247. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 397 (2d Cir. 2002).
248. Coop. De Sequiror Multipler de Puerto Rico v. San Juan, 289 F. Supp. 983, 987
(D.P.R. 1968).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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Act has applied to violations of both the Sherman and the Clayton
Acts.2 50 As a result, the Sherman Act's remedial provision became ves-
tigial and was repealed as unnecessary in 1955.251 Given that it is by his-
toric accident that the treble damages provision governing all antitrust
actions is contained within the Clayton Act, the Second Circuit erred in
holding that Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply to conduct and
the Clayton Act to apply to remedy.
In addition, the Second Circuit thesis is refuted by the fact that the
Clayton Act, as well as the Sherman Act, contains provisions governing
conduct: § 3 prohibiting certain vertically imposed restraints restricting
the customer, such as exclusive dealing and tying, where the effect may
be to substantially lessen competition; 252 § 7 barring mergers where the
effect may be to substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce
in any section of the country;2 53 and even § 2-the Robinson-Patman
Act-prohibiting price discrimination. 254 In other words, the assertion
that the Sherman Act applies to conduct and the Clayton Act to remedy
is a false premise because both Acts contain similar provisions.
Second, the court of appeals erred in embracing Judge Higginbotham's
dissenting opinion in Statoil involving the "plain meaning rule." The Sec-
ond Circuit fashions an overly literal construction of § 6a(2) of the
FTAIA that is too broad and at odds with the statute's fundamental pur-
pose to limit subject matter jurisdiction over foreign claims. Equally im-
portant, the Second Circuit, like Judge Higginbotham, would abrogate
the antitrust injury requirement in FTAIA cases and thereby make it eas-
ier for foreign plaintiffs to sue in American courts. Rather than parsing
the FI'AIA and viewing the statute in its historical context, the court took
the dubious position that the FTAIA does not alter prior Second Circuit
case law and then, backing and filling attempted to craft a Procrustean
argument that interprets the FTAIA in a way that is consistent with its
prior case law.
3. D.C. Circuit
The Achilles heel of the majority's opinion in Empagran is its undue
and, in the end, inappropriate reliance on Pfizer for the proposition that
the goal of deterrence supports the finding of subject matter jurisdiction.
This is the "Pfizer fallacy." As previously noted,2 55 Pfizer predated the
FTAIA by four years. Pfizer dealt with a straightforward issue of statu-
tory interpretation of substantive antitrust law; specifically, whether a for-
eign government was a person within the meaning of section 4 of the
Clayton Act.
250. Id.
251. See Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 311 n.8 ("Section 7 of the Sherman Act was
repealed in 1955 as redundant.").
252. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000).
253. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
254. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
255. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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That issue is wholly separate from the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion under the FTAIA. Without subject matter jurisdiction, a federal
court lacks adjudicatory authority to proceed with a case. Subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by the legislature. It is true that permitting for-
eign purchasers injured by price-fixing in transactions in the domestic
market-the facts of Pfizer-would enhance antitrust deterrence. Even
if one accepts the majority's view in Empagran that permitting the for-
eign plaintiffs injured in foreign transactions to sue would also enhance
deterrence, the case for subject matter jurisdiction is unaffected. Nothing
in the statute or its legislative history-not even the approving citation of
Pfizer-suggests that Congress intended to broaden subject matter juris-
diction under the FTAIA so as to increase deterrence. Congress, in fact,
was trying to limit subject matter jurisdiction through the FTAIA.
Moreover, it is not clear that barring foreign plaintiffs from suing
would necessarily impair deterrence. The Empagran court cited no em-
pirical data to support its assertion that precluding foreign plaintiffs from
suing on a foreign claim would undermine the deterrent function of anti-
trust. Instead, the court relied on legislative history. The legislative his-
tory says only that "[tlo deny foreigners a recovery could under some
circumstances so limit the deterrent effect of the United States antitrust
laws that defendants would continue to violate our laws, willingly risking
the small amount of damages payable only to injured domestic
persons." 256
Congress does not appear to have subscribed to the view that keeping
foreign plaintiffs out of American antitrust courts would necessarily de-
crease deterrence. On the other hand, even if the majority in Empagran
were correct that allowing foreign antitrust plaintiffs to sue in American
courts on transactions carried out abroad would enhance deterrence in
civil cases, permitting such suits may well have the perverse effect of de-
creasing overall deterrence. The key to the Antitrust Division's success
in prosecuting international cartels during the last decade has been its
corporate leniency policy. 257 Under this policy, a company, if certain spe-
cific conditions are met, may avoid criminal prosecution by cooperating
with the government. 258 The company would, however, remain vulnera-
ble to private treble damage suits. Faced with significant potential treble
damage exposure based on foreign claims, a company may choose not to
cooperate with the government. 259 Such a decision may have a snowball
effect, making it more difficult for the Antitrust Division to detect and
prosecute violations and more difficult for private plaintiffs to sue. In
256. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 10.
257. See Corporate Leniency Policy, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9113,113 (Aug. 10, 1993),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm.
258. Id. For example, the party seeking leniency must be the first defendant in the door
and must not be a ringleader in the conspiracy.




short, Pfizer provides no support for the expansion of subject matter ju-
risdiction under the FTAIA.
Even if one were to accept the court's view that Pfizer supports a more
expansive approach to jurisdiction under the FTAIA, that argument loses
considerable force when viewed in the context of today's global econ-
omy.2 60 The antitrust landscape has changed drastically since the Pfizer
decision. At the time Pfizer was decided, and indeed at the time the
FTAIA was enacted, the United States was the only sheriff in town when
it came to antitrust. 261 Twenty-five years later, that is no longer the case.
Over ninety countries now have antitrust regimes in place.2 62 The EU and
Canada have especially aggressive enforcement policies. In large part,
that remarkable transformation is due to the vigorous efforts of the
United States through its enforcement agencies to convince industrialized
countries of the virtues of competition and of the need to assure free
markets. The bottom line is that today there is no reason to assume, as
the majority in Empagran seemed to assume, that if the United States
does not prosecute conduct affecting foreign plaintiffs, no antitrust au-
thority in any other country will.
B. "DIRECT, SUBSTANTIAL AND REASONABLY FORESEEABLE"
The requirements of § 6a(1) of the FrAIA have proven less trouble-
some for courts and hence are less controversial. While courts have not
yet developed a unified "effects test" under the FTAIA, there is an
emerging consensus on several issues that offers a useful guideline in con-
struing § 6a(1). Thus, courts generally agree that it is the situs of the an-
ticompetitive effects, not the situs of the anticompetitive conduct, that
matters under the FTAIA. 263 The fact that American companies alleg-
edly engaged in illegal conduct does not by itself establish the requisite
anticompetitive effects on the domestic market.264 On the other hand,
where anticompetitive conduct is wholly foreign but specifically targeted
at the United States, the requisite effects will ordinarily be found.265 An
effect is direct if it results in an increase in process in the United States or
a reduction in output, including a reduction in imports.266 An effect is
also direct if there is elimination of significant competition in the domes-
tic marketplace. 267 However, a mere spillover effect on domestic com-
260. Id.
261. While other nations, notably Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany, had an-
titrust regimes in place at that time, enforcement 25 years ago was far less intense than it is
today.
262. William J. Kolasky, International Convergence Efforts: U.S. Perspective, Address
to the International Dimensions of Competition Law Conference (Mar. 22, 2002), available
at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/10885.htm.
263. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 2002).
264. Id.
265. See Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997).
266. Ferromin Int'l Trade Corp. v. UCAR Int., Inc. 153 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
267. See Coors Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 889 F. Supp. 1394,1397-98 (D. Colo.
1995).
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merce is not sufficiently direct to meet the F-AIA standards. 268 In
addition, the effects on the domestic marketplace must be "substantial";
mere ripple effects in the United States from anticompetitive conduct
abroad do not meet the statutory standard.2 69 Further, the effect must be
"direct" in that there is a causal link between the wrongful conduct and
the anticompetitive effect felt in the United States. 270 Finally, the plain-
tiff bears the initial burden of showing anticompetitive effects in the do-
mestic arena, and the mere intent to affect the United States market is
insufficient to meet the FTAIA standard.271
C. STANDING
Even where a foreign plaintiff can establish that its claim is not barred
by the FTAIA, it still faces the formidable hurdle of demonstrating stand-
ing to sue. Antitrust standing involves two related but distinct concerns:
(1) whether the plaintiff has a stake in the litigation; and (2) whether this
particular plaintiff is in the best position to sue on the claim.272 The first
concern is statutory; the second is a prudential concern of the courts.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 273 provides that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" may sue for treble damages. Despite the broad wording of
the statute, courts have consistently held that the right to sue does not
extend to everyone who might suffer from the ripple effects of antitrust
violations and have restricted the class of plaintiffs who may prosecute a
suit to those in the best position to sue.274 Antitrust standing is lacking
where a plaintiff's claims are indirect, remote or consequential. 275 Thus,
courts consistently deny standing to employees,276 shareholders,277 and
suppliers278 of antitrust victims.
In FTAIA cases, courts have treated the question of standing as sepa-
rate from the question of whether a plaintiff is outside the statutory ex-
emption. For example in Kruman, the Second Circuit, after concluding
that the FTAIA did not bar the foreign claims, remanded the matter for
268. Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
269. Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Snd. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2638 (2003). "Links to the United States are mere drops in the sea of
conduct that occurred in Southeast Asia." Id.
270. Info. Res. Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1002, 1106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(finding no jurisdiction under FTAIA where "the link between the defendants' conduct
abroad and the price ... in the United States is far from apparent").
271. Dee-K, 299 F.3d at 292.
272. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 53.3 (Robert L.
Haig ed., West Group & ABA) (1998).
273. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
274. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970).
275. Id. at 187.
276. Reibert v. Atl. Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.).
277. J.0. Pollack Co. v. L.G. Balfour Co., No. 72 C 845, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10787,
at *4 (N.D. I11. Dec. 8, 1972).




consideration of the standing issue. 279 In Galavan280 and Microsoft,281
the courts dismissed the foreign claims on standing grounds alone where
foreign plaintiffs suffered injury solely from diminution of competition in
foreign markets. Standing in a United States federal court is, by defini-
tion, lacking. A foreign plaintiff injured outside of the United States also
may not assert a claim based on the domestic injury suffered by someone
else. Even where a foreign plaintiff can show some injury in domestic
commerce, standing will be denied "to preserve the effectiveness of the
superior plaintiffs. '282
V. SYNTHESIS
The FTAIA is a poorly drafted, needlessly complicated and woefully
inadequate statute. Yet, Congress is unlikely to revisit its subject matter
in the near term. Therefore, the burden falls on the courts to construe
this law in a way that makes sense. Set forth below are some guiding
principles in FTAIA construction.
First, the United States antitrust laws do not, and were never intended
to, govern commercial conduct throughout the world. Only conduct that
substantially and directly affects the trade or commerce of the United
States should be a concern of its antitrust laws. Neither the fact that a
defendant or defendants in an antitrust action by a foreign purchaser is
American nor the fact that the alleged illegal conduct took place in the
United States establishes subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act.
Second, the FTAIA was meant to limit, not expand, the reach of the
antitrust laws. The expansive approach taken in Kruman and Vitamins
and proposed by Judge Higginbotham in Statoil would have the opposite
effect on antitrust laws by broadening subject matter jurisdiction where
foreign plaintiffs are involved. While foreign purchasers participating in
the domestic market should be treated the same as domestic purchasers
in the domestic market, the foregoing approaches would have the anoma-
lous effect of treating foreign plaintiffs more favorably than domestic
plaintiffs by effectively abolishing the requirements of antitrust injury in
FTAIA cases. There is nothing in the statutory language or the legislative
history of the FTAIA that would support such a liberal interpretation of
the FTAIA.
Third, deterrence is an important policy goal of private treble damage
actions. Nevertheless, deterrence and subject matter jurisdiction are sep-
arate inquiries. The deterrence considerations cannot even be addressed
until after subject matter jurisdiction has been established. Equally im-
portant, failure to assert Sherman Act jurisdiction does not necessarily
279. Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002).
280. Galavan Supplements, Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. C97-3259 FMS,
1997 US Dist. LEXIS 18585 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1997).
281. In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D. Md. 2001).
282. See Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
2188 [Vol. 56
2003] NEW FRONTIER IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
lessen deterrence. The conduct in question may well be within the juris-
diction of another antitrust authority, which may then take appropriate
enforcement measures. The antitrust sun does not rise and set in Wash-
ington, D.C.
Fourth, the Kruman and Empagran holdings, by making it easier for
foreign plaintiffs to sue, create a dangerous likelihood of overdeterrence
contrary to the fundamental purpose of the FTAIA to limit the scope of
antitrust in cases involving foreign transactions. Moreover, the generous
approaches of the D.C. and Second Circuits threaten further to tax an
already overburdened judiciary.
Fifth, this generous approach to antitrust jurisdiction increases the like-
lihood of marginal lawsuits. The tactical value of creating a class of for-
eign plaintiffs for settlement purposes alone is significant, even if on the
merits the case is marginal. Thus, Kruman and Empagran tilt the anti-
trust playing field decidedly in favor of foreign plaintiffs.
Sixth, even under a very broad approach to FTAIA jurisdiction, most
cases brought by foreign plaintiffs are doomed to failure on standing
grounds. Standing in the antitrust context involves two interrelated ques-
tions: (1) whether a plaintiff has a stake in the litigation; and (2) whether
a particular plaintiff is in the best position to sue. While foreign plaintiffs
may have little difficulty establishing a stake in the litigation, they invari-
ably fail the second prong of standing because other plaintiffs are typi-
cally better situated to sue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress intended the FTAIA to limit the extraterritorial reach of the
antitrust laws and to clarify the confusing precedents that have evolved in
the wake of Alcoa. Recent decisions on the court of appeals level that
allow foreign plaintiffs to proceed in United States courts on claims based
on foreign transactions have shattered what had been a solid consensus at
the district court level to bar such suits. The circuit court decisions have
both undermined the FTAIA by expanding jurisdiction and created
greater confusion in the law by relying on shaky rationales. The battle
lines have been drawn; it is now up to the Supreme Court to provide a
definitive construction of the FTAIA and to assure that the lower courts
are faithful to the will of Congress.
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